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Pahulu v. University of Kansas,
897 F. SuPP. 1387 (D. KAN. 1995).
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Alani Pahulu ("Plaintiff') was a college football player who was

disqualified for medical reasons from participation in intercollegiate athletics.
Plaintiff sued the University of Kansas, its Chancellor, Athletic Director, and the
University Athletic Corporation, (collectively "Defendants"), alleging that his
disqualification violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Act").' Plaintiff sought

a preliminary injunction to prevent his disqualification from the team. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas found that Plaintiff, who was

diagnosed with a congenitally narrow cervical canal, was not "disabled" according to the definition provided in the Act. In addition, the court held that, even if
Plaintiff was disabled, the conclusion of the university's physicians that Plaintiff
was at an extremely high risk for potentially severe and permanent neurological
damage if he continued to play football meant that he was not "otherwise
qualified" for purposes of the Act.
FACrS
Plaintiff received an athletic scholarship to play football for the University of
Kansas ("KU"). During an intrasquad game at a spring practice, Plaintiff suffered
a blow to the head which left him dazed with numbness and tingling in his extremities. The condition was described by physicians as transient quadriplegia. In
a subsequent examination, the team physician discovered that Plaintiff had a condition known as a congenitally narrow cervical canal. After consulting with a
neurosurgeon from KU Medical Center, the team physician concluded that based
on Plaintiff's "previous episode of transient quadriplegia and markedly stenotic
cervical canal, [Plaintiff] is at extremely high risk for subsequent and potentially
permanent severe neurological injury including permanent quadriplegia."2 As a
result, Plaintiff was disqualified by KU from participation in intercollegiate football.
Plaintiff, believing that he was physically able to play football, sought additional opinions about his condition and his prohibition from playing college
football. After seeing three specialists, all of whom concluded that Plaintiff was
at no greater risk of paralysis than any other player, Plaintiff requested that the
prohibition on his participation in college football be lifted. In addition, Plaintiff
offered to indemnify and release the defendants from any liability in the event
that he might be injured. The team physician and the neurosurgeon, however,

1. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1995).
2. Pahulu v. University of Kansas, 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (D. Kan. 1987).
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refused to reverse their decision to bar Plaintiff from playing football. Again, the
physicians based their decision on their belief that Plaintiff was at great risk of
severe injury. KU and the other defendants adhered to this conclusion.
Plaintiff then sued KU, its Chancellor, the Athletic Director and the Kansas
University Athletic Corporation, alleging that their refusal to let him participate
in intercollegiate football was a violation of section 504 of the Act.3 Defendants'
motion to dismiss was denied, and Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

The main issue before the district court was whether or not there was sufficient cause to grant Plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief. Under the standard
adopted by the Tenth Circuit, the party seeking a preliminary injunction must
demonstrate that (1) he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not
granted; (2) the threatened injury to the party outweighs whatever damage the
proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; (3) the injunction, if issued,
would not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will succeed on the merits.' In order
to satisfy the fourth element of the test, the movant must show that the questions
going to the merits of the case are so "serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful"
that they are ripe for litigation and require more deliberate investigation.5
The court had little trouble disposing of the first three elements. First, Plaintiff
demonstrated that he was entering his final year of eligibility for intercollegiate
football, and if injunctive relief was not granted, the irreparable harm would be
his loss of eligibility and a reduced opportunity for a career in professional football. As for the second element, one of the named defendants acknowledged that
KU would suffer little, if any, foreseeable harm if the preliminary injunction was
granted. With respect to the third element, neither party offered any evidence to
indicate that granting the injunction would be adverse to the public interest.
The final element of the Tenth Circuit's test for preliminary injunctive relief
was the most troublesome for the court. In order to succeed on the merits, Plaintiff had to establish a prima facie case pursuant to section 504 of the Act.6 In
order to establish a prima facie claim under section 504, Plaintiff had to show
that (1) he is "disabled" within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is "otherwise
qualified" to participate in the activity or program in question; (3) he was excluded from the activity or program solely on the basis of his disability; and (4)
the program receives federal funding.7 The court immediately disposed of the
third and fourth elements concluding that they were not at issue.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1987).

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, (as amended 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1995)).
Walmer v. United States Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id.
§ 504 (amended by 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1995)).
Eivens v. Adventist Health SysJEastern & Middle Am., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 340, 341 (D. Kan.
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Before examining the first and second elements, however, the court discussed
the Tenth Circuit's standard of review for cases brought under the Act. Citing
the case of Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado,8 the court pointed out
that the inquiry under the Act must focus on whether the institution has, in fact,
discriminated on the basis of a handicap, regardless of whether or not there may
have been a rational basis for the discrimination.9 According to the Act, an "individual with a disability" is "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment."'"
The court had no trouble concluding that Plaintiff's condition was a physical
impairment. The real issue, in the court's analysis of whether or not Plaintiff was
"disabled" within the meaning of the Act, was whether or not playing college
football was a major life activity. In reaching its conclusion on this issue, the
court surveyed a wide array of cases and federal regulations in search of a definition for the term "major life activity." A recurring theme in the cases and
regulations reviewed by the court was that major life activities included both
learning and working." Indeed, Plaintiff argued that playing football was a significant component of his college education and that denying him the opportunity
to play football would deprive him of an opportunity to learn. The court stopped
short of denying that football may have been a major life activity for this particular plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Plaintiff's opportunity to
learn was not substantially limited by his inability to play football. The court
supported its conclusion by pointing out that, even though he was unable to play
football, Plaintiff still had his athletic scholarship which gave unlimited access to
the academic services available at KU. In addition, Plaintiff had an opportunity
to participate in the football program in a capacity other than as a player. Consequently, the court concluded that Plaintiff was not "disabled" within the meaning
of the Act.
The final issue addressed by the court in its analysis of Plaintiff's likelihood
of success on the merits was whether or not Plaintiff, even if he was disabled,
was "otherwise qualified" to play football. The court pointed to a United States
Supreme Court case which concluded that "an otherwise qualified person is one
who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap."' 2
The KU football program had a requirement that in order to participate as player,
an individual must have medical clearance. While Plaintiff offered the opinions
of the three specialists, who examined him subsequent to his disqualification, as

8. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
9. Id. at 1383-84.

10. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
11. Pahulu v. University of Kansas, 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Scharff v.
Frank, 791 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that the plaintiffs inability to participate in competitive sporting events and other demanding physical activities did not constitute a substantial im-

pairment of the plaintiff's major life activities)).
12. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
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evidence of his medical clearance, the court found that the conclusion of the KU
physicians was rational and reasonable and that Plaintiff was, therefore, not
"otherwise qualified" to play football.
CONCLUSION

The court determined that Plaintiff would not prevail on the merits of his
claim because even though football might be a part of his major life activity of
learning, he was not "disabled" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
Furthermore, even if he was disabled, he was not otherwise qualified due to his
high risk for subsequent and potentially permanent severe neurological injury.
Since Plaintiff was unable to show a modified likelihood of success on the merits of his claim, the court denied his motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
FredrickB. Weber
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